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The 2010 HMGs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here?
Steven C. Salop
Fiona Scott Morton*

Abstract

In this article, which is part of a RIO Symposium on the Tenth Anniversary of the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, we suggest a number of improvements that should be considered
in the next revision of the Guidelines. Our analysis is based on the observation that horizontal
merger policy has suffered from under-enforcement. We provide evidence that the enforcement
agencies face significant resource constraints that require a triage process that inevitably leads to
under-enforcement. In light of merger law placing greater weight on avoiding false negatives and
under-deterrence than false positive and over-deterrence, the article suggests a number of ways
in which the under-enforcement bias might be corrected, including (among others): rolling back
the increase in the HHI “red zone” thresholds; mandating anticompetitive presumptions for
mergers with high GUPPIs, acquisitions of mavericks, and acquisitions by dominant firms;
closer analysis of common ownership by financial funds; and expanded analysis of potential
competition mergers.

I.

Introduction
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMGs) were cast as an evolutionary step

beyond the 1992 HMGs and the 2006 Merger Commentary. In this article, we suggest further
improvements that should be considered in the next revision of the HMGs. Our analysis is based
on the observation that horizontal merger policy has suffered from under-enforcement and false
negatives.

1

Over the last 50 years, “Chicago School” thought has worked to persuade courts that
“false negatives” (i.e., under-deterrence and insufficient interdiction of anticompetitive mergers)
are less harmful to consumer welfare than are “false positives” (i.e., over-deterrence and
excessive interdiction of potentially procompetitive mergers).1 However, the legal standard for
mergers is “may be substantially to lessen competition.” Interpreting the statute to mean the
probability of a merger substantially lessening competition must exceed 50% would be
significantly stricter than what U.S. courts actually do. It is not necessary to show such a high
probability of the merger’s substantially lessening competition. Instead, the standard requires
only an “appreciable risk” or a “reasonable probability” that competition will be reduced.2 This
point is recognized in Section 1 of 2010 HMGs, which state that the Guidelines “reflect the
congressional intent that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their
incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for
a merger to be illegal.”
Greater weight on false negatives is reflected in the longstanding legal standard that
mergers that create a significant market share in a concentrated market are legally presumed to
be anticompetitive, and the burden is placed on the merging parties to rebut that presumption.
This presumption is analogous to a Bayesian prior. If the presumption is triggered, the burden is
placed on the merging parties to offer rebuttal evidence. Thus, the default legal standard is to

* The authors are Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Salop) and
Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics, Yale University School of Management (Scott Morton).
1

The goal of antitrust law, including merger law, is consumer welfare. In the case of mergers among
competing sellers, this corresponds to consumer surplus, not total surplus. This goal is reflected in the
HMGs’ requirement that merger-specific cost savings must be sufficient to deter price increases.
2

A standard that is based solely on the probability of consumer harm does not properly account for the
level of expected harm if the harms of false positives and false negatives are unequal. Thus, a 50+%
standard would under-enforce if the harm from a false negative exceeds the harm from a false positive.

2

enjoin such mergers -- absent evidence that either undermines the market share and
concentration evidence or provides a procompetitive justification. This standard is important
because the HMGs are intended to be consistent with a merger law that is not premised on the
Pareto principle, total surplus, or an overarching focus on preventing false positives.
In short, a default enforcement rule of “do nothing if the agency is unsure what will
happen in the future” is clearly inapplicable to a merger enforcement policy that is designed to
protect consumer surplus, as well as the wording of the statute itself. Not enforcing is an active
choice that can harm consumers.3
There also is evidence that the enforcement agencies face significant resource constraints
that require triage that inevitably leads to under-enforcement. The number of transactions that
can be effectively investigated or litigated is limited. The agencies have resources to investigate
only those mergers that suggest the most serious concerns, not all the mergers that raise real
concerns. Constraints on the number of cases that can be litigated inevitably force the agencies
to accept weaker-than-optimal consent decrees or even to clear mergers that deserve to be
remedied or enjoined. Triage also naturally leads to under-deterrence.4 Triage further suggests
to courts that the standard for illegal effects is much higher than it actually is, since the selection
of cases that go to trial are disproportionately harmful.

3

If determination of competitive effects were fairly obvious, the choice of default might not matter. But
the likely effects are not obvious: If they were, firms would not spend $15-25 million going through a
“second request” (or $10-20 million more on a preliminary injunction hearing), if the required divestiture
or the need to abandon or restructure the deal was so obvious at an earlier point. Nor would merger
retrospectives reveal significant false negatives.
4

This is the reverse of the proverbial Texas Ranger with just one bullet, but who can deter a crowd
because no one wants to take the risk of rushing him first. But the Ranger fails to deter when all the
members of the crowd move at the same time. Kleiman (2009).

3

We have not seen evidence that is sufficient to reject this hypothesis. Consider the
following:
•

Agency budgets have not kept pace with the number of reported mergers. One would
expect that more transactions would also involve more deals that raise potential
concerns. Table 1 reports agency budgets for the 2010-2018 period, relative to the
number and value of merger transactions. The BRM Index gauges the decline since
2010 in the agency enforcement budgets relative to the number of merger
transactions. The BMV Index gauges the decline relative to the dollar value of M&A
transactions. 5 Table 1 shows that budgets have declined by approximately 30% since
2011, relative to M&A activity. We also suspect that agency costs of second request
investigations and litigation also have increased over time as the role of quantification
has increased.

•

The number of agency “second requests” for additional information is much more
stable than is the number of reported mergers that might warrant intensive
investigation. Table 2 shows that the number of second requests has ranged between

We use the DOJ budget for the Antitrust Division. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2020), Appropriation Figures
for the Antitrust Division Fiscal Years 1903-2021. Retrieved from
https://www.justice.gov/atr/appropriation-figures-antitrust-division. However, our data for the FTC
budget includes its consumer protection mission. Fed. Trade Comm’n (2020). FTC Appropriation and
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) History. Retrieved from https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureausoffices/office-executive-director/financial-management-office/ftc-appropriation. The enforcement budget
for any given year is a sum of those two figures. The adjusted number of mergers that are reported -transactions for which a second request could have been issued -- comes from Fed. Trade Comm’n &
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2019, p. 22 & n.2). Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report Fiscal Year. Retrieved from
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-competitiondepartment-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-rodino/fy18hsrreport.pdf. The M&A value data come
from the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances. IMAA (2020). Announced M&A in the United
States by Numbers and Value by Years. Retrieved from, https://imaa-institute.org/m-and-a-us-unitedstates/.
5

4

42 and 55 in 2010-2018, while the number of transactions ranged from less than 1300
to more than 2000.6 This is consistent with the number of second requests’ being
limited by resource constraints and some problematical mergers’ being cleared.
•

Table 2 also reports that a very high percentage of the deals that get a second request
are challenged. This suggests that only the very most troublesome mergers are
investigated. This data also is consistent with some problematical deals falling
through the cracks. Indeed, most merger lawyers (who lack “Stockholm Syndrome”)
have experienced surprise at deals that escaped without a challenge, or sometimes
even without a second request.

•

The agencies have a very high win rate in litigated cases. In the 2012-2018 period, in
cases where the agencies filed a complaint without an accompanying consent decree,
the agencies prevailed in more than 35 cases: by winning in court; by obtaining a later
settlement; or by the parties’ abandoning the transaction. The merging parties have
prevailed in court in only three cases. One loss was a “potential competition”
merger,7 and one was a vertical merger,8 where the law is less favorable to
challenges.9 This high win rate is consistent with both limited deterrence and risk-

Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2019 p. 22 & n.2), Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report.
Retrieved from https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureaucompetition-department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-rodino/fy18hsrreport.pdf.
6

7

FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015).

8

United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.D.C. 2019).

9

The agencies lost two cases that were filed in 2019: One was litigated as horizontal but was as much a
vertical deal: United States v. Sabre Corp., No. 19-1548-LPS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64637 (D. Del.
Apr. 7, 2020). The other was a straight horizontal merger case: Federal Trade Commission v. RAGStiftung et. al., No. 19-2337, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18346 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2020). The data on wins has
not yet been reported.

5

averse agencies that threaten to take only the most egregious cases to court. A rough
estimate is that the alleged post-merger HHIs in cases that have gone to trial for the
past two decades have averaged above 5000, with average delta HHIs exceeding
1500.10
•

The high stakes of the merging parties yield incentives for them to spend considerable
legal and economic resources in criticizing and rebutting the agencies’ quantitative
evidence and presenting their own additional econometrics. The agencies must do
more to keep up, but resource constraints limit their ability. The combination of high
stakes for the merging parties and agency resource constraints also suggests that the
false positive rate would be low. The parties have incentives to fight very hard to
justify their deal -- regardless of whether the value of the deal flows from efficiencies
or from market power.

•

Econometric evidence is consistent with consolidation’s leading to market power.11
Economists have carried out a number of retrospective analyses of mergers that show
that a number of significant mergers have led to reduced competition even when there
are consent decrees. Kwoka (2014) retrospectively reviewed mergers generally, while

10

Authors’ calculations.

11

Scott-Morton (2019) and the Joint Response to the House Judiciary Committee on the State of Antitrust
Law and Implications for Protecting Competition in Digital Markets separate mergers from other
anticompetitive activity. Baker (2017) and Baker et al. (2019) focus on macroeconomic evidence that
demonstrates a grim, economy-wide increase in market power. For macroeconomic evidence on rising
profit share, see Barkai (2016) and Barkai et al. (2018). For macroeconomic evidence on the rise at the
top end of the markup distribution, see Gans (2019). For labor evidence on monopsony, including the
negative effects of non-competes, see Goolsbee et al. (2019), Prager et al. (2019), and Kreuger et al.
(2018).

6

Cutler et al. (2013), Dafny et al. (2016) and Gaynor et al., (2020) reviewed the effect
of consolidation in the hospital industry.
In light of this evidence, and our own judgement as observers of merger enforcement, our
view is that the competitiveness of the U.S. economy would benefit from stricter merger
enforcement. This article sets out a number of proposals that might be considered for the update
to the HMGs.
We frame our proposals in light of the three-step burden-shifting approach that is used in
merger law: In Step 1, the agencies must present enough evidence of risk of anticompetitive
harms in order to shift the burden to the merging parties to produce sufficient rebuttal evidence.
The agencies normally satisfy this burden through an anticompetitive “structural presumption,”
which involves sufficiently high post-merger HHIs and HHI increases or, alternatively, direct
evidence. If the parties produce sufficient rebuttal evidence in Step 2, then the burden shifts
back to the agencies in Step 3 to persuade the court that the merger will fail the overarching legal
standard.
Concerns about false negatives suggest that the required evidence required of the
agencies to satisfy their Step 1 case should be lowered, that the rebuttal burden placed on the
merging parties in Step 2 be raised, and that the agencies’ ultimate burden of persuasion at Step 3
be reduced. These changes would deter more anticompetitive merger proposals and permit the
agencies to negotiate stronger settlements . Setting legal presumptions and evidentiary burdens
is a legal issue, of course. Senator Klobuchar introduced legislation in 2019 (S307) that would
reduce the evidentiary burden on the agencies by replacing the standard from “substantially”
lessens competition to “materially” lessens competition, where “materially” is defined to mean
“more than a de minimis amount.” It also would mandate a substantial rebuttal burden for
7

certain large horizontal mergers, whereby the firms would be required to show that their deal
would not materially harm competition -- in contrast to current law, where the burden is placed
on the government.
Absent legislation, the agencies can change enforcement policies but not the legal
burdens in court. However, because the courts respect the agencies’ expertise, the HMGs could
have a role in influencing the law. Thus, we will note some policy changes that will require
changes in the law -- not simply changes in agency enforcement policy that is reflected in the
HMGs.
II.

Suggestions for Revisions in the HMGs
We next suggest a number of revisions to the HMGs’ merger enforcement policy and some

desirable legal changes that the HMGs might influence.
A. Adopt an Anticompetitive Presumption Based the GUPPI and Eliminate the GUPPI Safe
Harbor.
The 2010 HMGs popularized the use of upward pricing pressure (UPP). They describe in
words the Value of Diverted Sales (VDS) and Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI).
They suggest in §6.1. that the superiority of these metrics over the HHI for evaluating unilateral
effects.12 We suggest the HMGs adopt an anticompetitive enforcement presumption that is based
on the GUPPI that could meet the agency’s initial burden even if the HHI thresholds for the

12

This remark might be read by a laissez-faire oriented court as recommending abandonment or
weakening of the HHI anticompetitive presumption for complaints that allege unilateral effects. Since the
structural presumption is useful for reducing false negatives by resource-constrained agencies, that
language would be worth revising.

8

structural presumption are not. While not law, this would be a first step to a legal presumption
since the HMGs are designed to influence (i.e., “assist”) the law.
A GUPPI anticompetitive presumption would not be difficult to formulate. Salop (2009)
demonstrates that if the simple GUPPIs for both merging firms are at least 10%, then the
merging firms by themselves would more than satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test for a
separate market, if demand is linear and the SSNIP threshold is 5%.13 This enforcement
presumption would be rebuttable but should incorporate a sliding scale.
This analysis suggests that if the GUPPIs both exceed 10%, then the agencies should define
the market as comprised solely of the two merging firms, in which case the HHI would equal
10,000. While this is a possible approach, we do not think that it is necessary and may not be
advisable. First, the HMGs have a proviso that they will include in the market a firm C that is a
closer substitute to the either of the 2 merging firms than they are to each other. Second, the
10% threshold is based on linear demand. If demand is not linear a different threshold would be
called for. Third, the agency also may fear that the GUPPI evidence might be attacked. Finally,
and most important, the agencies often choose to define a market that is not the narrowest
possible market for good reason. They may correctly fear that the court will balk at a very
narrow market that violates its intuition or will attack the market definition as a gerrymandered
submarket. Given the risk, the agencies may decide that they can effectively argue for a
unilateral effect even in the context of a broader market.

13

Take for example a simultaneous GUPPI with uniform price increases, where GUPPIu = DR x M/(1DR) = 20%. With linear demand, the profit-maximizing price increase is GUPPIu/2 = 10%. As is noted
in the 2010 HMGs’ Example 6, limiting the market definition solely to these two firms might not satisfy
the additional test in the HMGs that the market must include products that are closer substitutes to either
of the two merging firms than they are to each other.

9

In retrospect, the failure to adopt a GUPPI anticompetitive presumption likely made
sense because GUPPIs were still considered novel. However, this is no longer the case. The
HMGs did suggest a quasi-safe harbor for “low” values of simple GUPPIs, where “low” was
subsequently defined as 5%.14 In retrospect, this may have been a mistake. The HMGs appear
to be premised on the assumption that every merger will lead to significant merger-specific
efficiencies and that an “efficiency credit” should be used to set the GUPPI safe harbor. By
contrast, Rose (2020) and others have accumulated evidence that most mergers do not produce
significant merger-specific efficiencies. This suggests that the GUPPI safe harbor might be
deleted entirely. It also suggests that a lower anticompetitive threshold might be adopted. 15
B. Lower the “Red Zone” HHI Thresholds
The 2010 HMGs raised the HHI threshold (“red zone”) for applying the anticompetitive
presumption from a level of 1800 and a change of 100 (or, “1800/100”) to a level of 2500 and a
change in 200 (or, “2500/200”). In retrospect, this may have been an unfortunate choice.
First, it is not clear why the HHI thresholds were increased, particularly since one goal of the
HMGs was to reduce the burden of proof for establishing coordinated effects. One possible
explanation is that there has been a major shift in emphasis in merger analysis away from

14

2010 HMGs §6.1 (text at n.11). In a subsequent speech when he was still the DOJ Economics Deputy
AAG, Carl Shapiro suggested that “low” meant 5%. Shapiro, Carl “Update from the Antitrust Division”
(speech at 24, Washington, DC, November 18, 2018). Retrieved from
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518246/download.
15

Note that simultaneous GUPPIs are higher than simple GUPPIs (Hausman 2010). In the HMGs Example
5, the simple GUPPI for each firm is GUPPI = DR x M, where the diversion ratio DR = 33% and the
percentage margin M = 40%, so that GUPPI = 13.2%. If the diversion ratios between symmetric
merging parties are both 33%, then simple GUPPIs of 13% translates into a simultaneous GUPPI of 22%
(= 13.2% x 1.67).
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coordinated effects to unilateral effects.16 This shift to unilateral may have led to economists
having a reduced interest in the HHIs and the red zone thresholds because the HHI level is not
relevant for the determination of competitive effects in the typical unilateral effects models.
However, it is an overstatement to say that the HHI level does not matter. First, in the Cournot
model with constant elasticity of demand, the pre-merger HHI equals the product of the weighted-average
price-cost margin and the demand elasticity. In their important recent paper, Nocke and Whinston

(2019) show that the increase in the HHI is relevant in predicting the critical level of marginal
cost savings to prevent consumer harm. They show that consumer harm often outweighs
assumed synergy levels even when the delta HHI is less than 100 points. If synergies are
assumed to be higher, then the critical delta HHI is larger. In addition, they show that if there is a
small efficiency credit, the critical cost savings to prevent a consumer welfare loss is larger when the HHI
level is higher. In light of the skepticism expressed in the HMGs regarding the level of verifiable

and merger-specific efficiencies, assuming very low (or de minimis) synergies would be more
appropriate in setting enforcement policy.
Moreover, in the current triage environment, lower thresholds would strengthen the agencies’
hand in the sliding scale and would improve deterrence and reduce false negatives. Indeed, this
enforcement benefit would follow even if the HHI entirely lacked predictive power.
Finally, we are concerned that over time the more permissive red zone will have an unintended
adverse side effect of creating a “vicious cycle” that will result in even more permissive agency
practice. The vicious cycle could develop as follows: Risk-averse agencies strongly prefer to

The fraction of FTC “second request” investigations that focused on unilateral effects rose from 16%
in fiscal years 1989-1992, to more than half in 1999-2000, and to 76% in 2011-2014. These figures do
not include alleged mergers to monopoly (Coate, 2019, p. 2-3).
16
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bring cases where they are highly confident that they will benefit from the “sliding scale,”
whereby “the more compelling the [government’s] prima facie case, the more evidence the
defendant must present to rebut it successfully.”17 As noted above, the HHIs in cases that reach
trial far exceed the red zone thresholds.
The HMGs are designed to assist the courts, who likely interpret the red zone threshold as
the agencies’ expert opinion of the point where the anticompetitive legal presumption “should”
apply. This is reinforced by the fact that HMGs state the agencies’ “enforcement policy,” based
on their “experience.”18 Thus, by announcing this higher internal threshold, the HMGs
communicate to courts that a higher threshold for the structural presumption is warranted.
This dynamic would tend further to weaken enforcement over the longer term.19 Even if the
effect does not show up explicitly in the relatively small number of court decisions, it can change
the behavior of potential merging parties and the agencies. It can lead potential merging parties
and their counsel to become more aggressive. It similarly may lead the agencies further to raise
their internal litigation threshold out of fear that the sliding scale has shifted somewhat. If more
mergers are proposed -- particularly more mergers with higher HHIs -- the agencies will need to
further adjust their triage process, which will cause feedback effects on second requests, consent
decrees, and litigation decisions.

17

United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

18

HMGs at §§1, 5.3

19

We view this as a longer-run trend rather than an effect that necessarily has occurred already, and we
lack evidence that this cycle is already underway. Analyzing this hypothesis would require non-public
data on the HHIs for mergers that are cleared without a remedy, as well as those that are challenged, and
the consent decrees demanded. It also would have to control for the policy goals of the different antitrust
administrations as well as exogenous changes, such as the merger wave of the late-1990s and the Great
Recession.
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These feedback effects necessarily will end up raising the internal red zone level. And, as
this information becomes known, the vicious cycle will be further reinforced. In the end, unless
budgets are increased accordingly, this vicious cycle will lead to increasingly more false
negatives.
C. Improve Analysis of Coordinated Effects
Unilateral effects dominate merger enforcement, perhaps because those models are more
tractable than coordinated effects models. UPP measures and econometric-based simulation
models can quantify unilateral effects. By contrast, except where there is a maverick,
coordinated effects analysis has been stuck in a process of weighing a checklist of facilitating
and complicating market factors.
Section 7.1 of the HMGs attempted to reduce the agencies’ burden of proof. However, aside
from identifying a maverick, it does not indicate what “signs” of vulnerability are sufficient or
the “credible basis” for concern. Nor does it explain what evidence of pre-merger coordination
should lead to a market definition price benchmark below the prevailing level (Baker, 2020).
This is important because unilateral effects analysis typically assumes that the prevailing price
represents a non-cooperative equilibrium.
Analysis of market definition for coordinated effects concerns raises a complexity because it
could either lead to prices rising or prices failing to fall. If the prospective merger partners were
coordinating their behavior less than perfectly pre-merger, then a post-merger price increase
would still be possible. But it is also that the merger might prevent price decreases. This is
because pre-merger coordination might unravel, whereas the merger will prevent this
unraveling. It is to account for this potential pre-merger unraveling possibility that the

13

benchmark price might be set at level below the prevailing price.

There have been some theoretical advances in the analysis of coordination (Harrington, 2013;
Sabbatini, 2016), which we do not have space to review, but more work is needed. The role of the
GUPPI or a similar UPP metric in analyzing coordinated effects might be explored in more detail. For
example, a unilateral incentive to raise price may increase the likelihood and magnitude of successful
coordination, for example, by altering the critical discount rate. There also have been some promising

econometric studies that identify past mergers that have created the conditions for coordinated
effects to thrive. For example, Ciliberto et al. (2014), Arval et al. (2018), and Borenstein (2014)
evaluated coordination in the airline industry. Likewise, in the U.S. beer industry, Miller et. al.
(2017) show that prices abruptly increased after the 2008 consummation of the Miller/Coors
merger. They explain these changes with a model of oligopolistic price leadership in which a
dominant firm (ABI) publicly announces price changes and competitors follow its lead.20 In
airlines, multiple horizontal mergers have increased market concentration and exacerbated the
problem of tacit collusion. Ciliberto et al. (2014) suggests that multimarket contact facilitates
airline coordination. He also shows that U.S. legacy carriers communicate strategic intentions in
earnings calls to induce market-wide reductions in capacity. In work on cross-ownership,
Spiegel et al. (2019) finds that firms acquire minority shares in actual or potential rivals to
stabilize collusive agreements. Even if collusion breaks down, minority shareholding in rival
firms helps to soften competition.

20

Miller (2017) also simulates the 2013 ABI/Modelo merger and shows that there would have been
lower consumer surplus, absent the divestiture..

14

The growing potential for algorithmic coordination also suggests greater coordination effects
concerns in the future. Algorithmic coordination involves firms’ using the combination of Big
Data and machine learning to price-coordinate successfully in online retail markets. Early papers
suggest that algorithmic coordination is possible, but it would be a complicated endeavor in a
world with exogenous shocks (Calvano et al., 2019a, b). However, algorithms likely will
improve. If a computer using machine learning can rapidly become a chess grandmaster, then
online sellers likely will learn how to coordinate prices successfully.
We encourage economists to complement and monitor the work that no doubt is being done
by sellers and business consulting firms. An increased likelihood of algorithmic collusion
through machine learning means that coordinated effects will be achievable in more
environments. Mergers will tend to increase the likelihood of successful algorithmic coordination
by reducing the number of major players. This is another reason why merger policy needs to be
tightened.
D. Include Discussion of Common Ownership by Financial Funds
The literature assessing the competitive effects of common ownership of product market
competitors by financial funds is growing rapidly (Bolle et al., 2020; Azar et al., 2018; Azar et
al., 2019; Backus et al., 2018; Backus et al., 2019; Gerakos et al., 2019; Newham et al., 2018). If
the empirical evidence continues to accumulate in a way that raises competitive concerns, the
analysis of acquisitions of stock will require greater attention from the agencies. We recommend
that the HMGs flag this issue now and discuss how the agency would approach such a case. We
further recommend that the agency engage in research – and gathering of relevant information –
to help inform future analysis.

15

E. Adopt an Anticompetitive Presumption for Acquisitions of Maverick Competitors

The 2010 HMGs comes close to suggesting an anticompetitive presumption if one of the

merging firms in a concentrated market has been a maverick competitor. We agree and suggest
that this be given more even visibility by making it a formal presumption in §7.1 and §2.1.5.
Maverick behavior was a focus of the HRBlock/TaxAct merger case, but the judge raised certain
criticisms of the concept because all of the competitors were disruptive.21 It would be useful to
address those concerns. It also would be useful to consider applying the concept to “killer
acquisitions,” as defined by Cunningham et al. (2020).22 The maverick presumption also might
be applied in markets with HHIs below the level where the structural presumption is triggered.
F. Expand Discussion of Post-Merger Competitive Interaction
Merging parties commonly attempt to rebut the anticompetitive presumption by arguing that
intense competition would continue post-merger. However, the HMGs need more discussion of
why post-merger competitive interaction among established firms generally would be
insufficient to protect consumers. In the Nash/Bertrand differentiated products model, for
example, price increases by the merging firms will increase profits in the post-merger game.
Moreover, price increases by the merging parties will generally lead to accommodating price
increases by non-merging firms.23 This “multi-lateral” reinforcing effect is not flagged in the

21

It also was important in the analysis of the AT&T’S attempted acquisition of T-Mobile in 2011.

22

Sabre’s attempted acquisition of Farelogix may fit the “killer acquisition” model.

23

Repositioning is a possible post-merger mitigating factor, so it would be useful to discuss when the one
effect would tend to dominate the other.
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HMGs.24 (The HMGs might tend to classify it as a coordinated effect, which also could confuse
a court and so should be clarified.)

G. Expand Potential Competition Merger Analysis

The 2010 HMGs note that the analysis of mergers with potential competitors apply the same
basic analysis as for horizontal mergers. However, expansion is warranted. In high tech
markets, leading firms commonly make acquisitions of firms that produce complementary (or
vertically related) products while they are still potential or nascent. These firms could become
significant horizontal competitors over time or partners to competitors of the leading firms.
Possible examples include Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp, Google’s
acquisition of DoubleClick and AdMob, and Amazon’s acquisition of Quidsi (the parent of
Diapers.com) and Zappos.

Current law sets an inappropriately high bar that is out of step with the competitive
importance of those nascent or potential competitors. The structural presumption does not apply
if the target lacks a significant market share and its future share is not sufficiently predictable.
The agency must show that the target has a high likelihood of entering a highly concentrated
market and having a significant competitive effect. The likelihood prong generally also requires
a concrete plan to enter soon.25 Potential entrants and nascent competitors may face a risk of
failure, which must be examined. The agency also must show that there are not a sufficient

24

These issues arise naturally in simulation models. But these effects are relevant even if there is no
simulation modeling.
25

E.g., FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (According to the FTC, it was only
necessary to show that the potential competitor “probably would have entered” the market absent the
merger,). By contrast, in its 1984 BAT decision, the FTC required “clear proof” that entry would have
occurred. In re B.A.T. Industries, 104 F.T.C. 852, 926 (1984).
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number of alternative entrants. If the acquiring firm is not dominant, showing substantial high
diversion ratios also might be required (Royall et al., 2010).
These requirements increase the risk of false negatives as the level of uncertainty inherent in
all these predictions is high even while the mean effects may be large. A court also erroneously
may focus on whether prices would rise above the current level rather than deter future price
reductions. The court also may focus on the probability of a competitive effect rather than the
expected value of the effect on consumer welfare.26 Finally, a common path to entry in many
technology markets is that an initially complementary service develops into a substitute, which
may be hard for the agencies to map with sufficient certainty to satisfy the current very high bar.
We suggest several changes: First, the agencies might analyze the consumer welfare effects
of the various possible paths and predict the expected value impact on consumer welfare, rather
than focusing on the probability, and explain the importance of doing so. The expected value
impact on consumer welfare often will be negative, even if the probability that the entrant
succeeds is significantly less than 50%. Second, the HMGs might adopt an anticompetitive
presumption for leading firm mergers, as discussed next. Economists can help by producing
careful retrospectives studies of cleared mergers, particularly when the nascent competitor was
alleged not to compete at the time of the transaction. Third, the agencies and the HMGs can
explain why such a high bar is not warranted. These proposals accord with those made by Bush
et al. (2004).

H. Adopt an Anticompetitive Presumption for Leading Firm Mergers

26

This amounts to failing to balance the consumer welfare effects of false negatives versus false positives.
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Enforcement also could be improved if the HMGs applied an anticompetitive presumption to
acquisitions of small, nascent, or potential competitors by leading firms and convinced the courts
to follow them. This presumption would not be novel. The 1982 HMGs had a strong
anticompetitive presumption when the leading firm had a share of at least 35% and the target had
a share of at least 1%.27

A strong presumption along these lines would be useful -- particularly for digital markets
where the “winning” firm is protected by strong network effects. In such markets, the incumbent
dominant firm has an incentive to acquire the entrant when it still is nascent, but may grow into a
significant competitive threat. The presumption should also apply to vertical or complementary
product acquisitions that involve potential or nascent competitors that might grow into horizontal
competitors or partners of horizontal competitors.
This approach would require courts to follow the agencies’ lead. However, as noted earlier,
the courts respect agency expertise, so the HMGs would have an influence. In addition, the
HMGs do not exist in a vacuum. The guidance can be supplemented by staff reports and
supportive studies by academics. Alternatively, this may be a possible area for new legislation.
I. Clarify the Treatment of Econometric Evidence
Every year more data become available, and economists naturally apply various econometric
and associated simulation modeling to predict the competitive impact of current mergers. The
2010 HMGs encourage the use of these methodologies.28 We share the concerns of Kaye (1983),

27

1982 HMGs at §III.A.2. The 1982 HMGs focused on coordinated effects and formulated the
anticompetitive presumption where the post-merger HHI exceeded 1800 and the increase in the HHI
exceeded 100. Those Guidelines did not address unilateral effects except with respect to that Leading
Firm Proviso.
28

For example, see the HMGs’ §2.1.2 (natural experiment evidence) and §6.1 (simulation models).
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Rubinfeld (1985), and Johnson et al. (2017) that, without clarification, the greater emphasis on
econometric evidence will lead to additional false negatives, as will be discussed below, and we
have suggestions to mitigate this concern. While we have some specific suggestions, our main
point is that current practice is out of date. The agencies should consider the approaches in the
literature (and perhaps new research) and adopt an improved statistical standard for merger
evidence.
We will focus on the econometric evidence. But before doing so, we note that econometric
techniques exist to address only some competitive concerns but not others. Advances in
technique often are not chosen because of the importance of the problem to real-world cases, but
because the latest statistical advances permit progress in a particular direction. Competitive
concerns that lack econometric techniques are no less important to consumer welfare than are
others.
For example, part of the reason that coordinated effects concerns have been given less
emphasis in recent cases may be that economists have not developed an econometrically
intensive measure to predict their prevalence. But if agencies or courts imagine that the lack of
an econometric technique is the same thing as the lack of an answer -- or a lack of importance -then entire classes of harm will go unenforced. This also could be a reason that innovation
concerns are typically given short shrift.
It is useful to begin the discussion of econometric evidence by discussing the agencies’ risks
of relying on econometric studies to make out their affirmative case in court. First, data sets
often are incomplete or contain some errors, and no econometric study is perfect. As a result, it
is possible to criticize even a rigorous, well-done study. While agency staff are well-equipped to
separate the important criticisms from the mere debating points, the relative merits of the
20

competing studies and the criticisms must be evaluated in court by a judge who is neither an
economist nor a statistician. This makes it difficult for the agency expert economist to explain
the study fully and address all of the criticisms that are made by the opposing expert.
Second, the usual econometric practice is to place the burden on whichever side offers the
study. For example, suppose a regression would predict that the merger harms consumer welfare
if an estimated coefficient is negative and benefits consumer welfare if the estimated coefficient
is positive. Suppose the negative impact would be “economically substantial” if the coefficient
is equal to (say) -2, or more negative. Suppose that the regression coefficient estimate is -2.5,
but is not statistically different from zero at a 90% level of confidence:
If this study were presented to the court by the agency to satisfy its burden of showing
consumer harm, the merging parties would argue that the prediction of economically substantial
harm be rejected because the null hypothesis of no (or positive) welfare effect cannot be rejected
with sufficient confidence. Of course, the agency can make the point that one also could not
reject a null hypothesis that the coefficient is -2.5 or even -5, in which case consumer welfare
would be harmed. But this counter may fail because of the mistaken design of the prior: Overemphasis is commonly placed on whether the zero-value null hypothesis can be rejected.
It is clear that p-values do not distinguish true from false claims.29 Standard hypothesis
testing (as above) focuses on avoiding Type I errors: erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis
when it is true. (Thus, this creates a neat correspondence between the Chicago School

29

On behalf of the American Statistical Association, Wasserstein et al. (2016) , released a statement that
contained six principles with regard to the use of p-values, including the following three principles: (2) Pvalues do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is true, or the probability that the data
were produced by random chance alone; (5) A p-value, or statistical significance, does not measure the
size of an effect or the importance of a result; and (6) By itself, a p-value does not provide a good
measure of evidence with regard to a model or hypothesis.
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assumptions and this naïve form of econometrics.) However, Type II errors of erroneously
failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is false will have meaningful welfare implications in
the type of cases that typically go to trial.
Stated in terms of false positive (Type I) and false negative (Type II) errors, the practice
of treating an econometric result as reliable only when the confidence level is above a specified
threshold -- typically 90%, 95%, or 99% -- guards against the likelihood of committing a false
positive error: erroneously rejecting the possibility that the merger will not reduce welfare. In
such a world, there has to be almost no chance that the merger harms consumers. But that is not
what the statute or sound policy directs. This is because by adopting this statistical stance, the
probability of erroneously rejecting the alternative hypothesis that the merger will reduce welfare
will grow substantial as the threshold rises -- yet avoiding a false negative error is critical for
adhering to the law: There is a fundamental trade-off between the two types of errors, and an
exclusive focus on false positives is undesirable -- both in terms of the text of the law and also
from the perspective of consumer welfare.
In our example, the solution actually is simple: The decision maker can focus on the
estimate of the expected consumer welfare effect -- taking both types of errors into account, with
the proper weighting being based on the welfare function. If the econometrics has been done
correctly, the estimate of -2.5 is an unbiased (or consistent) estimate of the expected welfare
effect: It is equally likely that the true merger effect is greater or lower than -2.5. In turn, the
estimate would mean that it is more likely than not that the true merger effect merger is negative
and economically substantial: more negative than -2. If the welfare function is not linear in the
estimated coefficient, then the expected welfare calculation amounts to placing differential
weights on false positives versus false negatives.
22

Kaye (1983) describes the problem as follows, where the “Alternative hypothesis” is a
harmful merger that the court is attempting to learn about with the available evidence: “The more
precise mathematical notation makes it plain that the burden of persuasion refers to one
probability- Pr(Alternative hypothesis: Evidence) – while the hypothesis test looks to another –
Pr(Evidence: Null hypothesis).”
Because the Null hypothesis of no harm may not be true, the Pr(Evidence: Null
hypothesis) test may not be very accurate -- despite being universally used. Instead, a prior is
needed that takes account of all of the information that is available before the trial. More
generally, balancing the two types of errors “optimally” would also depend on the strength of the
other, possibly non-statistical evidence.
One possible approach would be the adoption of a Bayesian decision approach that
makes use of prior information of the likely impact -- based, for example, on structural
presumptions, documentary evidences, or prior studies.30 For example, in the case of mergers
that trigger the HHI structural presumption or another presumption, the prior distribution would
be skewed towards anticompetitive effects. The agency would then update this prior distribution
in the face of the econometric evidence to arrive at a new, posterior distribution. However, the
Bayesian approach might be applied conceptually rather than formally because of the complexity
that is involved in calculating the posterior.
In our example, if the prior is sufficiently skewed towards anticompetitive effects, the
posterior may suggest that an economically substantial merger effect (-2 or worse) is more likely

30

For instance, Johnson et al. (2017 p. 658-661) presents a Bayesian decision framework in which the
strength of the econometric results and the prior probability of damages -- based on the other evidence -combine to determine a posterior probability distribution for the damage amount that summarizes all the
evidence and accounts for both types of errors.
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than not, even in cases where the standard econometric estimate is greater than -2 (i.e., less
negative). This can be used as the alternative hypothesis in the evaluation of Type II errors.
This analysis leads us to make several suggestions:
First, we suggest that the HMGs flag the fact that standard econometric practice tends to
focus solely on false positives and explain the resulting limitations and the reasons why that
approach will not be followed.31 We also recommend that the HMGs explain best practices for
courts. The HMGs could discuss the different ways to take account of false negatives as well as
false positives. For example, merger retrospectives of mergers that were investigated but cleared
by agencies or courts (often with conditions) find, on average, positive price effects.32 Along
with the structural presumption, the distribution of those price effects might constitute an
appropriate prior in a statistical test. We also recommend that the agencies encourage additional
research in this area to develop new methodologies.
Second, we suggest that the HMGs make clear that the agency does not require
quantitative evidence to satisfy its burden for the (Step-1) prima facie case, but can rely on the
structural presumption or another anticompetitive presumption. The HMGs also should make
clear that if the merging parties present quantitative evidence during the HSR investigation or in
court -- once the burden has been shifted to them from the presumption having been triggered or
other evidence-- the burden to show the statistical significance of the results rests on the parties,
not the agency.

31

In fact, the D.C. Circuit criticized the requirement that statistical evidence satisfy the 95% confidential
interval in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Kaye (1983). .
32

Author calculations based on data from Kwoka (2014) indicate the following price effects: overall
mean = 7.24%; N = 42. For mergers that were cleared during Democratic administrations, mean =
6.79%; N = 28; for mergers that were cleared during Republican administrations, mean = 8.14%; N = 14.
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Third, a complex back-and-forth between the experts can have the perverse effect of leading
the judge to ignore all the econometric analysis -- and, for that matter, the economic analysis -and rely instead on the self-interested testimony of the executives or the “hot documents.”33 For
this reason, it would be useful for judges to have testimony on these studies by an objective
court-appointed expert economist or economic consultant for the judge.34 While this is not a
strict HMGs issue, perhaps the HMGs could encourage it.
J. Account for a Merger’s Effect on Systemic Risk
Revised HMGs should consider taking account of the impact of mergers on welfare in the
event of low probability, large exogenous shocks.35 The Covid-19 pandemic has made clear that
the invisible hand may not adequately account for large exogenous shocks that create negative
externalities for consumers.
For example, it appears that mergers of meat processors have left the U.S. with a small
number of large plants. When workers get sick, plant closures cause large reductions in the
demand for animals from farmers, as well as shortages and increased prices paid by consumers.
Similarly, pharmaceutical industry mergers may have caused significant concentration in supply
chains and logistics. If a shock hits a region of China and raw materials are not available from
the supplier there, the resulting shortages cause more consumer harm than they would have when

33

New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

34

This has been done on occasion: For example, Alfred Kahn served as a consultant to the judge in the
1995 Post/Nabisco cereals merger case that involved warring econometrics by Ronald Cotterill and
Daniel Rubinfeld. New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
35

A fuller treatment of how such risk should be accounted for in merger review is laid out in Bloomfield
(2020)., and the references therein.
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the second manufacturer sourced from a different place, harm that would not fall on the
manufacturers.
These examples motivate a general point: If scale economies lead to mergers and
associated plant or logistical consolidation for each firm, then the risk of disruption -- e.g.,
epidemic, earthquake, or nuclear power plant meltdown -- will lead to a larger cost and price
impact than if there were more diversity.36 The price impact also will be higher if a dramatic
increase in demand bumps up against a more limited production capacity that is caused by
mergers that reduce excess capacity.37 Effects in intermediate goods markets also can cascade
across multiple markets, just as did the harms from the 2007-08 financial meltdown, as well as
an earthquake in Japan (Boehm et al., 2019; Acemoglu et al., 2012).
This raises the question of whether merger analysis should take systematic account of the
potential risks from such shocks.38 An increased potential for such harms that results from a
merger should be viewed as an adverse “competitive effect.” The HMGs make the point that the

36

For example, suppose that two mergers reduce the number of manufacturers from four high-cost firms
to two low-cost firms, so that prices fall despite the increased concentration. While price levels might be
only slightly lower in normal times, the impact of one plant’s shutting down for an extended period of
time might be much higher after the consolidation. Of course, the expected value of consumer welfare
also depends on the likelihood of an extended plant shutdown.
37

Competitive markets tend to lead to more excess capacity, because the rivals need additional capacity
so as to increase their shares.
38

Concern with exogenous shocks is not new. It has been recognized by merger analysts that it was risky
to rely on imports to constrain price increases by concentrated domestic firms because there might be
substantial changes in exchange rates or import quotas -- including quotas that are proposed by the
merging firms.
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costs of achieving efficiencies are included in the competitive effects analysis, and this increased
risk is such a cost.39
One cannot assume that firms would sufficiently account for the risks from such shocks,
if a substantial fraction of the effects would be externalized. For example, if positive demand
shocks lead to shortages because of capacity constraints, the consequent higher prices would be
passed on to consumers. Bankruptcy may partially externalize other harms. Of course,
consolidation sometimes can reduce the likelihood of cascading failures, by internalizing some
risks, so that offset also must be factored into the analysis.
The more difficult question is whether the potential for such shocks can be identified in
advance and whether the harms are sufficiently high to make such low-probability events worth
taking into account in merger analysis. The increasing interconnectedness of the international
economy and the frequency of crises in the last two decades suggests that the research evidence
likely exists (Baqaee et al., 2019), but it has not been assessed for possible inclusion in the
HMGs.

K. Stress the Need for Skepticism Towards the Opinions of Business Witnesses
The HMGs refer to the fact that evidence is obtained from various sources: the merging
parties, customers, and other industry participants and analysts. HMGs §2.2.3 expresses some
skepticism with regard to the views of rivals, except where the competition concern is
exclusionary conduct. It is surprising that the same skepticism is not expressed with respect to
testimony by executives from the merging parties. The HMGs §2.2.3 merely state that “[t]he

See 2010 HMGs §10: “Cognizable efficiencies are assessed net of costs produced by the merger or
incurred in achieving those efficiencies.”
39

27

Agencies give careful consideration to the views of individuals whose responsibilities, expertise,
and experience relating to the issues in question provide particular indicia of reliability.”
New HMGs should explain in more detail the fact that unsupported claims from individuals
who are employed by the merging parties that they will not raise prices, or promises that are not
embedded in consent decrees or binding private contracts, should be viewed very skeptically for
several reasons: First, company officers and Boards of Directors have fiduciary duties to
shareholders to maximize profits (using legal strategies). If the merger creates the economic
incentive for the merged firm to raise price (or reduce output, quality, or innovation), then such
strategies will and must be implemented. Second, an executive may have financial or career
benefits from the merger that distort his incentives or beliefs. Third, the relevant “person’s”
behavior in an antitrust case is the corporate person, not any particular executive. Therefore,
courts should focus on the evidence that shows the incentives of the firm and testimony about
those incentives -- and not on contrary self-serving statements.
The opinion of the judge in the AT&T/Time Warner vertical merger case provides an
example: The judge was highly dismissive of the testimony of the cable company executives
that testified against the merger. These companies were the direct customers of Time Warner and
would suffer price increases for Time Warner conduct, according to the DOJ complaint, as well
as being downstream competitors of AT&T. The judge believed that there was a “threat that
such testimony reflects self-interest rather than genuine concerns about harm to competition.”40
By contrast, the judge did not apply this same degree of skepticism towards the testimony of the
executives of the merging firms, who did not even have these mixed motives.

40

AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d at 92.
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The HMGs should make clear that the unit of observation in a merger review is the
company, not the executive. If ordinary-course-of-business documents -- written by managers
“in the field” as they attempt to earn profits for their company -- reveal the strategy of the
company with the use of the tools that are familiar to the agencies and economists, this should be
the focus of the court.

III.

Conclusions
While the 2010 HMGs were a definite advance, experience suggests that there is more to

do. We hope that our suggestions will be helpful.
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Appendix: Tables

Table 1
Agencies’ Budget Shortfalls (2010-2018)
Budget-to-Merger Indices

Year

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

BRMI

126

100

105

110

88

81

83

75

72

BMVI

127

100

130

103

58

52

73

75

67

BRMI = Indexed Ratio of Enforcement Budgets to Adjusted Number of Mergers Reported (2011
Index = 100)
BMVI = Indexed Ratio of Enforcement Budgets to Total Value of US M&A Transactions (2011
Index = 100)

Table 2
Second Requests vs. Number of Transactions
For Which Second Requests Were Possible (2010-2018)

Year

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

No. of Transactions*

1,128 1,414

1,400

1,286

1,618

1,754

1772 1,992

2,028

Second Requests

42

55

49

47

51

47

54

51

45

Challenged Transactions**

33

35

43

30

32

42

46

39

38

*Adjusted transactions in which a second request could have been issued
**Includes only challenges of unconsummated mergers; challenges are listed in the year of the second request
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